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Prior to the conference, the organizers asked me for my thoughts 
on how an anthropologist might approach the problem of studying 
judging.  Those thoughts follow.  I have subsequently reflected on the 
discussion at the conference itself, and I conclude this essay with those 
reflections. 
When I think of “judging” as an anthropologist, I think of two of 
the classics in legal anthropology:  Paul Bohannan’s Justice and 
Judgment Among the Tiv1 and Max Gluckman’s The Judicial Process 
Among the Barotse.2  Both of these books were ethnographic studies of 
African tribal courts during the latter days of British colonial rule.  The 
tribal judges were prominent in both books, and when I teach them in 
law school I ask students to compare the tribal judges’ roles and 
conduct to what they know about contemporary American judges.  
Like American judges, these African judges sometimes maneuvered 
the disputants into settlements and sometimes issued final judgments.  
Unlike American judges, they never wrote opinions.3  So one could 
understand them only by watching, listening, and attending to all 
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RHODESIA (ZAMBIA) (2d ed. 1973) (1955). 
 3.  See id. at 250 (“{T}here is no written corpus of judicial precedents {among the 
Barotse}.”); id. at 288 (noting that “the absence of written precedents . . . limits judicial logic”). 
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aspects of their behavior, including such apparently trivial details as 
how they arranged the seating in the open-air courtroom. 
I also think—though far less grandiosely, of course—of the work 
that Mack O’Barr and I did in American small claims courts in the 
1980s and 1990s.4  Like their African counterparts, the judges we 
watched in these courts persuaded, cajoled, threatened, and, when 
necessary, judged.  Nothing except the basic terms of a final judgment 
got committed to writing.  Moreover, again as in the African courts, the 
small claims judges had broad and largely unreviewable authority to 
impose whatever “law” they saw fit.  In one memorable case that 
involved a dry cleaner’s liability for a damaged suit, the judge decided 
to await and abide by the ruling of that august supranational tribunal, 
the International Fabricare Institute. 
Regardless of any methodological preferences or preconceptions 
we might have had, the absence of written work product forced us—as 
it had forced Gluckman and Bohannan—to focus on the performance 
aspects of judging.  Exactly what did the judges say?  Just how did they 
say it?  What was their non-verbal behavior like?  And a good thing, 
too: this enforced focus on behavior led us in directions we never would 
have thought of on our own.  We found a range of judging styles and 
approaches; in anthropological terms, each courtroom had its own legal 
culture, created by the judge.  Within these mini-cultures, we found 
curious echoes of such jurisprudential schools as formalism and 
realism, as well as applications of the psychological concept of 
procedural justice.  This is not to say that the judges were consciously 
enacting these theories, but enacting them they were. 
This focus also led to another set of findings, all derived from an 
initial observation that courtroom interactions are a form of 
conversation.  (This observation was influenced by an earlier study of 
British courts, Max Atkinson and Paul Drew’s Order in Court.5)  
Practitioners of various forms of “ethnomodology" (including 
conversation analysts, linguistic anthropologists, and the many species 
of discourse analysts) have long demonstrated that “doing” 
conversation is an enormously complex social task, one that requires 
detailed rules.  Moreover, ethnomethodologists argue, these and other 
things that we think of as social “rules" are not rules in the sense of 
preexisting principles that need only to be applied.  Rather, they are 
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“phenomena of order,” apparent rules that people “attend to," and 
that “emerge” over and over again as people negotiate concrete social 
situations.  For example, two separate discourse analyses of actual jury 
deliberations (by Doug Maynard and John Manzo, in 1993,6 and Robin 
Conley and me, this year7) have shown, respectively, how principles of 
justice and standards of proof are produced by jurors in the course of 
their conversations.  In the small claims courtroom, O’Barr and I saw 
emergent rules for such judging problems as displaying authority, 
“doing” due process, showing empathy, and delivering bad news. 
But why would these approaches have any relevance for those 
who study “real” judges?  In a current draft of a paper on the practical 
impact of “landmark” decisions, Professors George, Gulati, and 
McGinley8 suggest that the crowd divides into two general camps:  the 
legal scholars, who parse opinions; and the political scientists and their 
allies, who count and otherwise slice and dice outcomes.  Why might 
either camp care about methods of studying judging developed while 
sitting under a tree in Nigeria or in grimy small claims courts around 
the United States? 
Because “real” lawyers and their clients might care.  The most 
striking observation made by George et al. is that practicing lawyers 
and judges as well as potentially affected citizens may not define 
“landmark” in the same way as academics.  In the case that George’s 
group focused on, what the eggheads expected to be earth-shaking 
barely registered on the ground. 
This leads to a corollary idea more directly related to judging:  
practicing lawyers may define “good” and “bad” judges in very 
different ways than academics.  Law professors tend to praise written 
opinions that are logically tight, that deal appropriately with precedent, 
and, most of all, that validate the professors’ policy preferences.  The 
authors of such opinions are “good” judges.  Similarly, quantitative 
studies tend to exalt judges who write lots of opinions (some 
researchers prefer long ones and others short ones), who rarely get 
reversed, and who get cited often. 
 
 6.  Douglas W. Maynard. & John F. Manzo, On the Sociology of Justice: Theoretical Notes 
from an Actual Jury Deliberation, 11 SOC. THEORY 171 (1993). 
 7.  Robin H. Conley & John M. Conley, Stories from the Jury Room: How Jurors Use 
Narrative to Process Evidence, 49 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 25 (2009). 
 8.  Tracey George, Mitu Gulati & Ann McGinley, The (Relative) Unimportance of Case 
Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/he/Events/eveFile/The%20Relative%20Unimportance%20—
%20Gulati.pdf. 
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But talk to practicing lawyers and you might get a different 
emphasis.  (I base this generalization on my own six years in full-time 
practice and 26 as of counsel to a firm and student of the profession.)  
First, reversing the priority of their status-conscious academic betters, 
lawyers may focus more on trial than appellate judges because of per 
capita impact on their practice.  They are often more interested in how 
law is administered in their cases than in what law is made in 
“important” cases.  Second, my guess is that practitioners would 
identify a much higher proportion of “bad” judges.  If, for instance, one 
were to rely solely on the testimony of former law clerks now in 
academia, all federal judges would emerge as hybrids of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes and St. Thomas More.  But practitioners see some of 
these same judges as, in varying combinations, lazy, stupid, and mean 
(to quote my brother, a practicing lawyer).   
In identifying “good” judges, practicing lawyers are likely to ask 
such questions as: How does s/he behave in court?  Does s/he treat 
lawyers, litigants, and witnesses fairly and courteously?  Can s/he 
manage a trial competently? Does s/he actually listen or does s/he 
prejudge things?  Will s/he decide motions in a reasonable period of 
time, or does s/he ignore them in the hope they’ll go away?  How smart 
is s/he? 
These judicial qualities, I suspect, are very important to those who 
must live with the judges.  But they do not necessarily emerge from 
written opinions, nor from aggregations of outcomes.  They would 
become evident only through an inductive, ethnographic approach to 
judging that paid particular attention to language.  I wonder what other 
“phenomena of order" might emerge.  I suspect that important clues 
to the legitimacy of the legal system might reside in the details of 
courtroom interactions, and that a significant, “emergent” notion of 
justice might reveal itself as well.  The point is that, based on 
anthropology’s experience, including my own, I would not know what 
hypotheses to test a priori, but would instead expect the unexpected. 
An aside: the legitimacy issue was brought home to me when I 
made my first visit to the European Court of Justice this past summer.  
With a group of students, I attended a hearing in a case about import 
duties (a private company versus the European Commission).    The 
lawyers argued in German, the judges spoke in French (badly, since 
none came from France), and I listened alternately in French and 
English.  The lawyers read prepared remarks and the judges asked no 
questions; their only utterances were organizational and perfunctory 
(“We’ll hear now from Herr X”).    Instead, they stared with glazed 
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eyes or flipped through the parties’ written submissions.  I could not 
imagine what value this presumably expensive exercise had for anyone 
(except the private-sector lawyer, of course). 
After the hearing I discussed it with an ECJ staff lawyer.  I asked, 
in more polite language, “Why bother with this charade?”  I suggested 
that the court learned nothing and the parties did nothing to advance 
their cases that couldn't have been done better in writing.  He didn’t 
disagree, but said that hearings helped to legitimize the ECJ in the eyes 
of litigants and, more broadly, to inculcate EU citizenship.  I could not 
imagine how.  But I thought that if I had been paying closer attention—
paying ethnographic attention, as it were—and had a chance to study 
and restudy my own, linguistic transcript of the hearing, I might have 
been able to figure out how the court and its constituents were “doing” 
legitimacy. 
All of these considerations lead to the methodological question of 
how an ethnographer would study “real” judges (federal district 
judges, let’s say).  One thought might be to collect trial transcripts of 
cases that had been appealed and do discourse analysis.  That would be 
interesting.  However, from a sociolinguistic perspective, that would be 
more a study of transcripts than a study of judicial behavior.  Court 
reporters perform a subtle kind of interpretation, and their work 
product is not what a linguist would call a transcript.  Moreover, trial 
transcripts miss much of what counts as judicial behavior, even in the 
courtroom. 
The only ethnographic solution would be to do what Bohannan 
and Gluckman did in Africa, and O’Barr and I did in small claims court:  
pick some judges, spend days or weeks in detailed observation of their 
behavior in court (I can’t imagine getting into chambers), tape record 
it all, and prepare and analyze the detailed, multi-dimensional 
transcripts that discourse analysts use.  In terms of permission, the 
watching part would be easy, probably a matter of constitutional right 
(meddling Institutional Review Boards be damned).  The recording 
part would require the permission of each judge.  Based on previous 
experience (in both small claims and, in graduate school, “big” court), 
some would agree and some wouldn’t.  All would insist on permission 
from lawyers and litigants.  Perhaps surprisingly, all that I encountered 
agreed. 
Again based on previous experience, it would be a long and 
demanding project, but by no means undoable.  As models, compare 
not only my small claims work but Beth Mertz’s 2007 book, The 
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Language of Law School,9 which analyzed discourse in several first-
year law school classes around the country (and, as I think about it, is 
an excellent illustration of every point I’ve tried to make here).  For 
the reasons already advanced, I think such a project would be 
eminently worthwhile, although probably in surprising ways.  I doubt 
I’ll do it, but I hope someone will. 
REFLECTIONS ON THE CONFERENCE 
Being an anthropologist, I approached the conference itself as an 
ethnographic opportunity—I don’t know any better.  It was another 
day among the “natives,” in this case an array of federal and state 
judges, trial and appellate, and some academics who are interested in 
studying them.  Two themes stood out. 
The first was the sharp distinction between trial and appellate 
judging.  Trial judges engage in complex conversations.  Many times 
these conversations are live, oral, and public, as when a judge conducts 
a trial, a motion argument, or a sentencing hearing.  The judge must 
not only apply the law in real time, but must also manage the human 
interaction.  Most trial judges realize that their job in an adversary 
system is to stay as far in the background as possible while letting the 
parties produce the trial.  The lawyers are frequently repeat players 
with whom the judge will have to deal again and again.  This task—
“doing trial judging”—strikes me as remarkably challenging, both 
intellectually and sociologically.  And it must be done while looking 
over one’s shoulder, since the whole performance is subject to public 
review, (sometimes unfair) recharacterization, and (sometimes 
withering) critique. 
Appellate judges, by contrast, spend most of their time 
manipulating written texts.  As they described it at the conference, 
their work consists largely of reading briefs, memos, cases, and statutes; 
drafting, circulating, and reading opinions; and attempting to persuade 
colleagues in written (and, increasingly, electronic) communications.  
Live conversations in the form of oral arguments and conferences with 
colleagues are the exception.  With the exception of the oral 
arguments, the work of appellate judges is done in privacy and relative 
anonymity.  When they do perform publicly, they—in contrast to their 
trial colleagues—are expected to be the stars, interrupting and 
 
 9.  ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A 
LAWYER” (2007).
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hectoring the lawyers with questions that sometimes seem intended to 
show off as much as to focus the arguments. 
These functional differences brought home to me the point that 
studying judging encompasses two quite different projects.  To study 
the performance of trial judges is to study public behavior and public 
documents.    It is thus inherently doable, even if extraordinarily labor-
intensive.  Appellate judges, however, do most of their work in a secret 
world that is seemingly impenetrable to ethnographers or others who 
rely on direct observation. One can study only the judgments and 
opinions they are required to release to the public; the performance 
that underlies these carefully crafted documents is immune to scrutiny.  
The second observation derives from the first: judges have 
difficulty being anything but judges, and the trial-appellate distinction 
carried over into the conference discussion.  The trial judges, by and 
large, conversed.  They asked and answered questions and seemed 
eager to have external, scientific perspectives on what and how they 
are doing.  The appellate judges acted like, well, appellate judges (with 
apologies to the exceptions).  They monopolized the floor, interrupted, 
and sometimes went on, and on, and on.  There was nothing unpleasant 
about this; on the contrary, the whole event was unfailingly cordial. It 
was just that the appellate judges stayed in courtroom character.  When 
they discussed their behind-the-scenes work, they saw few problems 
that were worth studying. They have things under control (aside from 
the rare colleague who doesn’t work well with others and writes 
gratuitous dissents).  We academics will never get in, of course, but 
what would be the point?  (And academic idolatry of federal appellate 
judges only eggs them on.) 
So I came away from the conference with mixed feelings.  Trial 
judges want to be studied, and there are many ways to do it, with 
ethnography well-positioned to play a role.  But at the appellate level, 
it seems that we will be limited to the analysis of outcomes.  As it 
usually does in legal scholarship, “empirical” will continue to mean 
“quantitative.” 
 
